A semantic account of truth along the lines initiated by Alfred Tarski has a number of advantages that render it theoretically attractive. One is that it becomes possible to use the same methods and materials to define both truth and logical consequence. On the other hand the theory comes at a price. One element is that the ontological cost of deploying the tools required to define truth render it unacceptable to those of a non-platonist persuasion, something of which Tarski was only too painfully aware. Another element is that it is not clear how the Tarskian method of delimiting the true from the false connects with the intuitive notion of truth as answering in some way to the way things are in the world. It was for this reason among others that the modern theory of truth-making was initiated. Truthmaking, whatever form the correct theory may take, for its part eschews the idea that truthmakers should be in general epistemically and semantically transparent to the user of the idiom whose truth-bearers are thereby rendered true. There thus appears to be a radical disconnect between the model-theoretic approach to truth and the truth-making account, so that they might as well be about different things. This paper will attempt to bring the two approaches together, show how they interact and complement one another, and can be deployed together to provide a nominalistically acceptable account of truth and consequence.
look for a biographical or psychological explanation as to why the great logician should have been nominalistically inclined. My reaction is the opposite: it is to consider how we can retain as much as possible of Tarski's results and insights within the constraints of a strict nominalism. 3 It is instructive here to compare Tarski with his teacher Leśniewski. The latter's nominalism was so uncompromising that he was prepared to forego logical results, fame, friendships and editorial influence rather than be sullied with the platonism of set theory. As a result, Leśniewski's achievements in logic are greatly outrun by those of his ontologically less fastidious colleague. I shall be looking to radically extend ideas of Leśniewski in the interest of boosting the power of nominalism to give an account of mathematical truth.
The talk presupposes and does not argue for certain framework assumptions. One is obviously nominalism, by which I mean simply the denial that there are any abstract entities.
This of course rules out mathematical objects as standardly conceived. This is part of a broader metaphysical framework assumption which I call naturalism, according to which all that exists is within the spatio-temporal-causal framework of the cosmos within which we are situated. This assumption rules out much more than abstract entities: in particular it rules out abstract attributes and states of affairs, Cartesian minds, disembodied souls, an eternal deity, and alternative possibilities. It does not rule out universals provided these are construed in a modest Aristotelian way as present where their instances are. Most of these denials are not operative in this paper.
Another contentious assumption driving much of what follows is a principle of sufficient reason, according to which there is always some kind of account that can be had when a proposition is true as to why it is true. The account is I believe not uniform in kind across all kinds of truths, but the question always makes sense, even if we don't know or have an answer to it.
My final prefatory note concerns two terminological decisions. I want a fairly neutral and readily understood term covering the variety of things -mental, linguistic and otherwise representational -that can be true or false. I shall co-opt the old term 'proposition' for this purpose. If I need to refer to a proposition in the sense of Church, which is that of Frege's
Gedanke and Bolzano's Satz an sich, I shall simply say 'abstract proposition'. In parallel, I
really ought to replace the equally ugly term 'truth-maker' by something more mellifluous, such as 'fact', but in spite of all temptations, parental pride still prevails here for now. an ontological rather than logical sufficient reason: the proposition is true because certain entities exist, and it is these entities that are called the truth-maker for the proposition in question.
In the context of nominalism any putative truth-makers will have to be particulars rather than abstract objects. In certain cases abstract entities would be prima facie candidates for truth-makers for the propositions in question, such as the existential propositions
There are four prime numbers between 10 and 20
There are infinitely many prime numbers So truths like these which on the face of it appear to call for the existence of abstract entities will need an alternative explanation.
Contingently true atomic propositions about everyday and scientific matters stand in need of a worldly reason why they are true. In our original 1984 paper, the drive to a nominalistically acceptable account lay behind our highlighting tropes (there called 'moments') as plausible candidate truth-makers for a wide range of such propositions. That paper highlighted two further facets of our truth-making theory. states of affairs independently of human activity. But both abstract propositions and states of affairs are beyond the nominalist pale, so the truth-makers for the actual proposition make it true without being represented by it, and most often without being represented by anything.
Models
The theory of truth-making was devised for contingent propositions and is not easily adapted to necessarily true or necessarily false propositions, even should one suppose it desirable to so apply it. Since necessary propositions have their truth-status come what may, it is generally otiose to look for something in the world forcing them to be what they will be anyway, although sometimes there will per accidens be truth-makers. For example, the same rain that makes it true that it rains in Warsaw on 17 September 2013 makes it also true by the entailment principle that it rains or does not rain in Warsaw on 17 September 2013. But this is a tautology and would have been true also had it not been raining then, so the rain in no sense forces the proposition to be true: and the proposition's truth places no constraints on the way the world is. In the case of truths of logic, an account of how they are true in all circumstances is plausibly required to appeal precisely to those recursive clauses devised to account for the truth of complex propositions in Tarski's theory, in each case relativized to an interpretation over a domain, and then quantified over. When we are considering alternative cases or possibilities, we typically do not have any entities that do any truth-making, so the additional layers of contingent ontological detail lying behind actual truth is lacking. That means that it is unpromising to look at relativizing the idea of truth-making to possible worlds as a way to account for necessity. On the other hand the much balder semantic ideas of terms having denotata, predicates having extensions, logical constants having fixed roles, and propositions being true or false, do not require the level of detail lying behind and attendant upon actual truth. These bald correlations are all that is required to generate models, which is why model theory can afford to be mathematical and not have to consider the empirical and circumstantial detail that real truth-making involves.
It thus looks as though the idea of truth-making evoked to service the account of truth simply fails to connect with that of a model evoked to account for logical truth and logical consequence, to the detriment of one or both aspects. There are three parts to a response to this worry. The first is that the notion of a model is schematic, so it is to be expected that arbitrary models lack the circumstantial and empirical detail of the actual case. The second is that because the notions of denotation, extension and truth-value do have application in the actual case, the detail comprehends the skeletal schema in that case, but not in the others.
Indeed the presence of all the additional corroborative detail is part of what it is to be actual.
The third is that we should not expect that an account of how truths are true in one area will automatically apply to truths in all areas. We have not mentioned this, but to the extent that the notions of truth and falsity are applicable in such axiological areas as ethics and aesthetics (which non-cognitivists would in any case dispute), we might well expect them to work in a very different way from the core cognitive areas.
In order to be in a position to represent a schema allowing alternative interpretations and models to be defined for propositions, we need objects to be denotations and extensions, and something like truth-values. The last are not crucial: provided we can mention at least one true proposition and one false one, all truths will be materially equivalent to the selected truth and all falsehoods to the selected falsehood. Denotation (at least for singular names) is easy: the object named is the denotatum. It is extensions of predicates that hitherto have called for abstracta, whether sets of tuples, sequences, functions or whatever. While I have indicated elsewhere 10 that a nominalist can get by to an unexpected degree without gathering meaning together in unified packages called extensions, it would be nice to have substitutes for the standard items in order to apply the methods of standard semantics. To that task we turn.
Multitudes
The logician Leśniewski refused to be pushed by anyone into doing logic in a way which he could not square with his philosophical conscience. That included not being pushed by his logical hero Gottlob Frege into treating all names as singular denoting terms. In Leśniewski's logic names can be empty, failing to denote anything (as in later free logic, or in the vernacular according to Frege), and they can also be plural, denoting more than one thing (as in the Aristotelian tradition). To employ a term Leśniewski did not, and of which he probably would have disapproved, let us call the several things denoted by a plural term a multitude.
Examples of multitudes are Whitehead and Russell, the people in this room now, the four evangelists, the Kings and Queens of Poland, and the Irish laureates of the Nobel Prize for Literature to 2012 (Yeats, Shaw, Beckett and Heaney).
Given a multitude, which is just these several individuals, and not a further individual over and above them (unlike the associated set), we may go on not only to distinguish Leśniewski did, but also multitudes of multitudes, of second and higher order, as well as multitudes of mixed order. The resulting hierarchy of multitudes resembles the cumulative hierarchy of set theory but differs from it in two crucial respects, both of which would gain Leśniewski's approval. There is no empty multitude, and there is no difference between a singleton multitude and its sole member. Where we part company from Leśniewski is in affirming that a plurality can be member of a higher-order plurality.
Acceptance of this entails a radical expansion of logic. All the details of how this should go are not yet clear, for example it is not clear whether there is a universal multitude, as there is a universal set in Quine's New Foundations system, or rather an open Zermelotype hierarchy, or finally an NBG-style distinction between "ordinary" multitudes and multitudes too "large" to be members of others. 11 However, whichever of these may turn out tobe correct, if we grant higher-order multitudes, then we reinforce the nominalist's hand.
Firstly, the only items required to generate multitudes of all the orders are individuals or urelements. More particularly, we need at least two individuals before a hierarchy is generated. Secondly, the multitudes all come for free on the back of the urelements: it is inconsistent to accept several things and deny their multitude (contrast set theory again). So the ontology is nominalistically acceptable: the multitudes are particulars and inherit their location from their members, but the world does not get any more crowded, since each multitude comprises its several members. Entities are multiplied, but of necessity. Finally, assuming, as is plausible, that an axiom of infinity governs the cumulation of multitudes, then as few as two individuals generate infinitely many multitudes and an infinite multitude. This has advantages when it comes to considering the ontological status of arithmetic. by adding to a sequence without repetitions, and whose members' first occurrences are correctly situated, further pairs indicating the substitution of a repeated member occurring earlier in the sequence for the member at the right place in the non-repeating sequence, so e.g. <c,a,a,c> is represented by c ca cad cadb da bc. The "dummy" members can be selected arbitrarily from among other things not numbered among the members to be repeated. We can then collect these multitudes representing sequences of a given length into a further higherorder multitude and this is then fit to be the extension of a predicate, in this case one with four places.
Infinite sequences can be represented in the same way, using infinite nested multitudes and replacement pairs. Since the arity of relations has no upper limit, the length of sequences can on finite domains outrun the number of individuals in the domain. In that case multitudes from higher in the hierarchy can if necessary be co-opted to serve as dummies in long sequences.
On this basis we are able to represent the extensions of relations and functions. In particular if we are given a multitude of expressions E constituting a language, we have the resources to construct an ersatz for an interpretation function from E to multitudes over D.
How we do this, in particular if the members of E are themselves all particulars (the road Tarski avoided) is something over which I shall wave a hand here, simply stating that it can be done. The procedure bears a non-accidental resemblance to the use of set theory in standard platonistic semantics.
The procedure is a little more complicated for a Leśniewskian language with empty and plural names at the lowest level. Empty names, as in free logic, are simply not assigned a denotatum, while a plural name is assigned the multitude of individuals it designates.
Sequences then have to start from higher-order multitudes, but they are available. Empty names and predicates which can take empty names give a little more trouble. One trick would be to concoct something to act as a null individual and arrange everything around that. A more realistic and philosophically satisfying if mathematically messier solution is to give explicit interpretation clauses for expressions containing empty names or quantifying positions into which empty names can slot. In this way there is the prospect of providing a formal semantic framework for Leśniewski's logic. In any case, unexemplified predicates require special clauses if one is not to have recourse to a null item. As ever, the platonist solution spares tedious but honest toil.
7 Consequences for Nominalists I claim that the employment of higher-order multitudes enables a nominalist to give a semantic treatment of first-and higher-order logics in a way which defuses the claims of Church, 12 Quine 13 and others that higher-order logic must be platonistically interpreted. It continues the work begun by George Boolos in rescuing higher-order logic from the strictures of Quine. 14 Boolos passed too lightly over the need to provide extensions for predicates, assuming something like the standard tricks would work. They do, but only once we ascend to higher orders of multitude.
Two obvious worries arise. One is that the treatment is not really nominalistic. I
concede that it will not please every kind of nominalist. In particular, one of Goodmanian persuasion who considers that there can be "no distinction of entities without a distinction of content" 15 will not accept higher-order multitudes, since the higher-order multitude ab bc is no different in content (meaning here: individuals on which it is ultimately based) from the different higher-order multitude ac ab or indeed from the first-order multitude abc. 18 The truth-making account of true applied probability propositions is unclear. And as indicated earlier I have not addressed matters of value.
However it seems to me that there is here a fairly robust link between truth-making considerations applicable in the real world and matters associated with logical consequence.
The Entailment Principle of truth-making states that if M makes it true that p and q follows logically from p then M makes it true that q. That brings both together. Being a hairshirt nominalist is not an easy intellectual pathway, but if with multitudes there is no need for abstract entities in semantics, such a nominalist can sleep a little more comfortably at night, and perhaps Tarski can rest more easily in his grave.
